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1 Introduction
In the literature there exist several game theoretic solution concepts which, in general,
determine di¤erent solutions of strategic games. Di¤erent equilibrium concepts arise
from di¤erent proposals for re…ning Nash’s (1950a,b) de…nition of equilibrium points
(see, e.g., Selten, 1975; Myerson, 1978; for an overview see van Damme, 1991). Di¤erent
iterative solution concepts - presuming successive elimination of unreasonable strategies
- apply di¤erent de…nitions of an unreasonable strategy (Bernheim, 1984; Moulin, 1984;
Pearce, 1984; Börgers, 1993). However, if a game is dominance-solvable - in the sense
that only a unique strategy survives iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies -
all these di¤erent strategic solution concepts determine the same unique solution. Thus,
dominance-solvable games describe the class of games for which most game theorists
agree in their predictions of how strategically sophisticated individuals will act in a
decision situation of strategic interdependency.
This paper extends existing results about dominance-solvability of strategic games
by providing su¢cient and necessary conditions for dominance-solvability of so-called
lattice games. On the one hand, strategy sets of lattice games exhibit a lattice structure,
that is, strategies are partially ordered and there exists for every pair of strategies an
in…mum and a supremum in the strategy set (Topkis, 1979; Milgrom and Roberts, 1990;
Vives, 1990; Milgrom and Shannon, 1994). On the other hand, strategy sets of lattice
games are assumed to be simultaneously subsets of some metric space such that the
distance between the smallest and the largest element - in lattice order - of some subset
is greater than the distance between the remaining elements of this subset. Due to this
dual property of strategy sets of lattice games, I am able to combine and generalize two
di¤erent strands in the literature about dominance-solvability of strategic games, namely
Moulin’s (1984) approach for nice games and Milgrom and Roberts’ (1990) approach for
supermodular games.
The most prominent results about strategic solutions of games - where strategy sets
have a lattice structure - concern existence and structure of Nash equilibria of super-
modular games (see, e.g., Topkis, 1978, Milgrom and Roberts, 1990; Vives, 1990) and
of games with a single-crossing property (Milgrom and Shannon, 1994; Athey, 2001).
Supermodular games are characterized by players whose actions are strategic comple-
mentarities (Bulow, Geneakoplos, and Klemperer, 1985), that is, a player’s incentive of
choosing a larger strategy - with respect to the lattice order - increases if her opponents
also choose larger strategies. Milgrom and Roberts (1990) now derive the remarkable
result that supermodular games are dominance-solvable if and only if they exhibit a
unique Nash equilibrium.
This paper’s …ndings extend Milgrom and Roberts’ (1990) result along two dimen-
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sions. First, if a supermodular game is also a lattice game - which is the case for standard
strategy sets - I can characterize uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium by a rather sim-
ple necessary and su¢cient mathematical condition. Thus, in addition to Milgrom and
Roberts (1990), this paper provides a speci…c technical criterion for uniqueness of the
Nash equilibrium in supermodular games which might be easier to verify (or to falsify,
for that matter) than standard theorems establishing existence of a unique …xed point.
Second, and more importantly, the results of this paper also establish dominance-
solvability of games that are not supermodular, and that therefore do not necessarily
exhibit increasing best response functions (as implied by supermodular games or by
games with the single-crossing property). Many relevant economic situations can not
be described as supermodular games since players actions are either strategic substitutes
(Bulow, Geneakoplos, and Klemperer, 1985) or only partial strategic complementarities.
In the applicational part of this paper I further elaborate on this point by applying
this paper’s theoretical …ndings to demonstrate dominance-solvability of games that are
not supermodular. In particular, I consider n-…rm Cournot oligopolies, auctions with
bidders who are optimistic - respectively pessimistic - with respect to an imperfectly
known allocation rule, and a simple Two-player Bayesian model of bank runs.
In the remainder of this introduction I explain in deeper detail this paper’s technical
contributions and the economic examples presented in the applicational part.
1.1 Technical Contributions
Exploiting the lattice structure of strategy sets I derive equivalence conditions - referring
to players’ utility functions - which imply that a game is dominance-solvable if and only
if it admits a unique point-rationalizable strategy. Point-rationalizability (Bernheim,
1984; Moulin, 1984; Pearce, 1984) is an iterative solution concept where strategies are
eliminated as unreasonable if and only if they are not a best response to some pure
strategy pro…le (or equivalently: to some degenerated point-belief about pure strategy
pro…les). Since, in general, point-rationalizability is a signi…cantly stronger solution
concept than iterated elimination of dominated strategies such equivalence conditions
are not trivial.
Exploiting the metric-space property of strategy sets I derive uniqueness conditions
for point-rationalizable strategies that refer to properties of players’ best response func-
tions. Moreover, the lattice structure of strategy sets allows for a particularly convenient
characterization of unique point-rationalizable strategies if best response functions are
either increasing for all players or decreasing for all players. Roughly speaking, a com-
bination of these equivalence- and uniqueness conditions then establishes dominance-
solvability of lattice games.
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1.1.1 Equivalence Results
This paper derives two di¤erent equivalence results that identify conditions so that a
game, satisfying these conditions, is dominance-solvable if and only if it has a unique
point-rationalizable strategy. Both equivalence results generalize similar …ndings ap-
pearing in Moulin (1984) and in Milgrom and Roberts (1990), respectively.
First consider strategy sets with an arbitrary lattice structure. Under the assump-
tion that players’ utility functions are supermodular with respect to their own strategies,
proposition 1 of this paper then derives equivalence between dominance-solvability and
uniqueness of point-rationalizable strategies if di¤erences in players’ utility functions ei-
ther increase or decrease with an increase in the opponents’ strategy choice. Increasing
utility di¤erences formally de…ne strategic complementarities whereas decreasing utility
di¤erences de…ne strategic complementarities. Thus, proposition 1 extends an equiva-
lence result due to Milgrom and Roberts (1990), which is restricted to supermodular
games where all players have increasing utility di¤erences only, to games where players
may have arbitrary monotonic - increasing or decreasing - utility di¤erences. As a conse-
quence, proposition 1 may therefore establish equivalence between dominance-solvability
and uniqueness of point-rationalizable strategies for games where, e.g., one or all players
have decreasing best response functions.
Now consider the degenerated case of a lattice structure where strategy sets are totally
ordered. Proposition 2 of this paper then demonstrates equivalence between dominance-
solvability and uniqueness of point-rationalizable strategies if players’ utility functions
satisfy a condition I call order-quasiconcavity (which is a straightforward generalization
of the de…nition of quasiconcavity on convex sets to arbitrary sets that are partially
ordered). As a consequence, proposition 2 generalizes an equivalence result due to Moulin
(1984) - who shows equivalence under the assumptions of strictly quasiconcave utility
functions and real-valued convex strategy sets - to games with general totally ordered
strategy sets that are not necessarily convex. Moreover, in contrast to the equivalence
result of proposition 1, proposition 2 establishes equivalence without entailing monotonic
best response functions. However, whereas proposition 1 applies to games where strategy
sets exhibit an arbitrary lattice structure, the equivalence result of proposition 2 requires
the rather strong assumption of totally ordered strategy sets.
1.1.2 Dominance-solvability Results
The concept of lattice games serves two technical purposes. First, since for lattice games
the diameter (de…ned as the least upper-bound of all distances between the elements of
a given set) of some order-complete set of strategies coincides with the distance between
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the set’s smallest and largest - in lattice order - element, a non-empty set of point-
rationalizable strategies contains a unique strategy if and only if the diameter of the set
of strategies, which survive iterated elimination by the point-rationalizability criterion,
converges towards zero when the number of iteration steps approaches in…nity. Second,
by the lattice structure of the strategy sets of lattice games, the equivalence conditions,
derived in proposition 1 and proposition 2, ensure that a lattice game is dominance-
solvable if and only if it admits a unique point-rationalizable strategy.
Proposition 3 of this paper derives a necessary and su¢cient mathematical condi-
tion establishing dominance-solvability of lattice games. In particular, it is shown that
convergence properties of a k–fold application of the best response function to itself
are necessary and su¢cient to guaranteeing for lattice games that the set of point-
rationalizable strategies is non-empty while the diameter of the set of strategies, which
survive iterated elimination by the point-rationalizability criterion, converges towards
zero. The proof idea parallels an approach due to Zimper (2003a) who generalizes …nd-
ings of Bernheim (1984) and of Moulin (1984). However, while the proofs in Zimper
(2003a) rely on the assumption of compact, respectively bounded and complete, subsets
of some metric space, the proof of proposition 3 exclusively refers to lattice properties
of strategy sets.
For lattice games with real-valued strategy sets, a corollary to proposition 3 estab-
lishes dominance-solvability if the …rst-order partial derivatives of functions - resulting
from a k-fold application of the best response function to itself - have su¢ciently small
values. Moulin’s (1984) su¢ciency condition for dominance-solvability of nice games
obtains as special case of the corollary when only 1-fold applications of the best re-
sponse function to itself are considered and when only the distance, induced by the
supremum-norm, is considered.
Under the additional assumption that players have monotonic best response func-
tions, which move in the same direction1, proposition 4 presents a signi…cantly simpler
characterization of dominance-solvability than proposition 3. The result of proposition
4 refers to convergence-properties of the k-fold application of the best response function
to itself only evaluated at the smallest and at the largest strategy of the strategy set.
On the one hand, proposition 4 therefore provides a simple characterization of unique
Nash equilibria of supermodular games that are also lattice games. On the other hand,
the …nding of proposition 4 will prove very useful for establishing dominance-solvability
in the applicational part of this paper where non-supermodular games with decreasing
best response functions are considered.
1That is, if the best response functions are either increasing for all players or decreasing for all
players.
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1.2 Examples and Applications
1.2.1 n-Firm Cournot Oligopolies
Strategic solutions of n-…rm Cournot oligopolies have been extensively studied in the
literature (see, e.g., Bernheim, 1984; Moulin, 1984; Novshek, 1984 and 1985; Bamon
and Fraysse, 1985; Vives, 1990; Basu, 1992; Amir, 1996). Two issues emerging from this
literature are of particular relevance to this paper’s topic. First, applied to classical mod-
els of n-…rm Cournot oligopolies, iterative solution concepts perform rather poorly since
they blow up the set of possible solutions when there are more than two …rms involved
(Bernheim, 1984; Basu, 1992). Second, the application of lattice-theory to character-
izing strategic solutions is typically restricted to Cournot duopolies only (Milgrom and
Roberts, 1990; Vives, 1990) since only Cournot duopolies can be transformed into su-
permodular games whereas actions in general n-…rm Cournot oligopolies are strategic
substitutes (but see Amir, 1996, who describes non-standard n-…rm Cournot oligopolies
where players have increasing best response functions).
Proposition 5 and proposition 6 of this paper apply this paper’s theoretical …ndings
to identify conditions which assure dominance-solvability of n-…rm Cournot oligopolies.
For the classical model of an n-…rm Cournot oligopoly - exhibiting a linear inverse
demand function and constant marginal costs - proposition 5 establishes dominance-
solvability if the di¤erent …rms’ products are not perceived as perfect substitutes by the
customers. If there are three …rms in the oligopoly then dominance-solvability already
obtains in case …rms’ products are arbitrarily close to being perfect substitutes, but
are not actually perfect substitutes. For more than three …rms a further weakening of
the perfect substitute assumption is required to assure dominance-solvability. Assuming
that …rms’ products are perfect substitutes, Bernheim (1984) shows for the classical
model of an n-…rm Cournot oligopoly that virtually any output decision can be justi…ed
by iterative solution concepts if the oligopoly consists of more than two …rms. Thus,
proposition 5 demonstrates that Bernheim’s (1984) negative result about the predictive
performance of iterative solution concepts strongly relies on the assumption that …rms
compete with products that customers perceive as perfect substitutes.
Proposition 6 of this paper derives conditions which imply dominance-solvability of
n-…rm Cournot oligopolies under the assumption that cost functions are quadratic and
that …rms compete on so-called large markets, as described by Börgers and Janssen
(1995), where an increase in the number of …rms is matched by an increase in market
demand. The …ndings of proposition 6 suggest, maybe somewhat contrary to intuition,
that an increase in the market-size rather increases than decreases the di¢culties for
establishing dominance-solvability.
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1.2.2 Auctions with Optimistic - respectively Pessimistic - Bidders
A second application concerns auctions where bidders are uncertain about the actual
allocation rule and exhibit optimistic, respectively pessimistic, attitudes with respect
to this rule. Such auctions are relevant whenever the organizer of the auction pays
attention to matters like bidder’s ”moral standing”, solvency, and so on2.
Auctions where one bidder is handicapped, in the sense that she has to o¤er a much
higher bid than a favored bidder in order to win the auction, have been studied by
Feess, Muehlheusser, and Walzl (2002). However, while in their model it is common-
knowledge among the bidders who is handicapped and who is favored, I describe a -
very simple - model of an auction where pessimistic bidders believe they are handicapped
by the allocation rule in the sense that they only expect to win with certainty if they
o¤er signi…cantly higher monetary bids than their competitors. Analogously, optimistic
bidders believe they are favored by the allocation rule so that they expect to win even
if they bid less money than their competitors.
Proposition 7 of this paper then shows that in auctions with pessimistic bidders all
bidders bid the highest amount allowed by their budget constraints, whereas in auctions
with optimistic bidders every bidder just o¤ers the reservation price demanded by the
auction’s organizer. Thus, the …ndings of proposition 7 imply that an auction-organizer,
who wants to gain high pro…ts while she does not know bidders’ evaluations or budget-
constraints, better lets the allocation rule imprecise if she expects pessimistic bidders,
whereas she should be very speci…c about the allocation rule’s details in the case of
optimistic bidders.
1.2.3 A Two-Player Model of Bank-Runs
Ever since the seminal contributions of Bryant (1980) and of Diamond and Dybvig
(1983) models of bank runs have been the subject of intensive study. At their core game-
theoretic models of bank runs presume a coordination problem where patient investors
achieve the good outcome when they simultaneously do not withdraw whereas they
only achieve the bad outcome when they simultaneously withdraw. While the early
models of Bryant (1980) and of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) describe this coordination
2Think, for example, of the Lottery Commission’s zigzagging when it had to decide, on behalf of the
British Goverment, whether the new seven-year operating licence for the British Lottery was granted
to Sir Richard Brenson’s People’s Lottery or to its competitor Camelot. At some point of time the
Commission said that it would neither grant the licence to the People’s Lottery nor to Camelot because
People’s Lottery had so-called ”technical problems over …nances” whereas Camelot was judged as ”not
to be a ”…t and proper” operator, largely because of its association with the American gaming software
company GTech” (quoted from a DAILY-TELEGRAPH internet article).
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problem as a coordination game exhibiting multiple equilibria, more recent approaches
(e.g., Postlewaite and Vives, 1987; Goldstein and Pauzner, 2002), try to deduce the
likelihood of bank-runs from a unique strategic solution.
As third application I present Two-Player Bayesian games of bank runs where players
choose between switching strategies that are characterized by a cuto¤-point so that the
player chooses to withdraw (not withdraw) for signals below (above) the cuto¤
point. Each player’s signal is independently drawn from a uniform distribution over
the unit interval where signals may be interpreted, e.g., as an investment project’s
success (as in Goldstein and Pauzner, 2002) or as investor’s preferences for intertemporal
consumption (as in Postlewaite and Vives, 1987).
Proposition 8 then establishes dominance-solvability of Two-Player Bayesian games
of bank runs and it derives the likelihood of bank runs from the unique strategic solution
of such games. Postlewaite and Vives (1987) also describe bank runs by a Two-player
Bayesian game. Their model admits only three di¤erent signals about players intertem-
poral consumption preferences and it exhibits, for a particular range of parameters,
dominant strategies for both players. In contrast to the model of Postlewaite and Vives
(1987), the dominance-solvable Two-Player Bayesian games of bank runs that I con-
sider exhibit a more complicated strategic structure since they do not possess solutions
in dominant strategies. In analogy to the global game approach of Carlsson and van
Damme (1993), Goldstein and Pauzner (2002) show existence of a unique equilibrium
for their model of bank runs. However, they do not establish dominance-solvability3.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 notation and ba-
sic de…nitions are introduced. Section 3 derives conditions implying that a game is
dominance-solvable if and only if this game has a unique point-rationalizable strategy.
Lattice games are formally de…ned in section 4; examples for possible strategy sets of
lattice games are provided. Section 5 contains this paper’s technical main results con-
cerning dominance-solvability of lattice games. The theoretical …ndings of this paper
are applied to establishing dominance-solvability of n-…rm Cournot oligopolies (section
6), of auctions with bid- respectively optimistic - with respect to an imperfectly known
allocation rule (section 7), and of Two-player Bayesian games of bank runs (section 8).
All technical proofs are relegated to the appendix.
3The model of Goldstein and Pauzner (2002) is actually not a global game in the typical sense since it
does not satisfy the supermodularity assumptions required for global games (compare Morris and Shin,
2002; Frankel, Morris, and Pauzner, 2003). Thus, in contrast to global games, a unqiue equilibrium
does here not imply dominance-solvability.
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2 Preliminaries: Notation, Lattice Theory
For a …nite set of players I, let G = (Si; Ui)i2I denote a game in normal form where
Si denotes the individual strategy set of player i 2 I and where Ui : Si £ S¡i ! R+
represents player i’s preferences over strategies in S. Let fi : S¡i ! 2Si denote player
i’s individual best response correspondence such that, for all s¡i 2 S¡i,
fi (s¡i) = arg max
si2Si
Ui (si; s¡i)
For the sake of presentational simplicity, throughout this paper only games with indi-
vidual best response functions are considered, that is, for all i 2 I and all s¡i 2 S¡i,
fi (s¡i) is assumed to be single-valued4 . Function f : S ! S , with f (s) = £Ii=1fi (s¡i),
is then called the game’s best response function.
Recall the following notions of lattice theory (see, e.g., Topkis, 1979; Milgrom and
Roberts, 1990; Vives, 1990; Fudenberg and Tirole, 1996):
Given a re‡exive, transitive, and antisymmetric binary relation ·L on a set Si. If
there exists for all elements si; ti 2 Si a supremum si _ ti and an in…mum si ^ ti in Si
then (Si;·L) denotes a lattice.
(Si;·L) is a complete lattice if, for every non-empty subset T ½ Si, inf T 2 Si and
supT 2 Si. In particular, completeness of Si implies existence of a smallest - the unique
minimal - element si 2 Si such that si <L s0i for all s0i 2 Si with s0i 6= si, and of a largest
- the unique maximal - element ti 2 Si such that s0i <L ti for all s0i 2 Si with s0i 6= ti.
(Si;·L) is totally ordered, i.e., a chain, if, for all si; ti 2 Si, si £L ti implies ti ·L si.
If (Si;·L) is a lattice for all i 2 I then (S;·L) denotes a lattice such that s ·L t if
and only if, for all i 2 I, si ·L ti.
Ui is supermodular on (Si;·L) if, for all si; ti 2 Si and all s¡i 2 S¡i,
Ui (si; s¡i) + Ui (ti; s¡i) · Ui (si ^ ti; s¡i) +Ui (si _ ti; s¡i)
Note that supermodularity of Ui on (Si;·L) is trivially satis…ed if (Si;·L) is a chain
since
si ^ ti = minfsi; tig
si _ ti = max fsi; tig
In particular, Ui is supermodular on (Si;·L) if Si ½ R and ·L denotes the standard
order · of the real numbers.
4This paper’s …ndings immediately generalize to games whose best response correspondences reduce
to best response functions after some arbitrary round of eliminating unreasonable strategies.
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Ui has increasing di¤erences on (S¡i;·L) if, for all ti ·L si, Ui (si; s¡i)¡ Ui (ti; s¡i)
is non-decreasing in s¡i. Conversely, Ui has decreasing di¤erences on (S¡i;·L) if, for all
ti ·L si, Ui (si; s¡i) ¡ Ui (ti; s¡i) is non-increasing in s¡i.
Furthermore, I call Ui order-quasiconcave on (Si;·L) if, for all chains (Ci;·L) ½
(Si;·L), and for all si; ti 2 Ci and all s¡i 2 S¡i,
Ui (si; s¡i) ¸ Ui (ti; s¡i)
implies Ui (s0i; s¡i) ¸ Ui (ti; s¡i) for all s0i 2 Ci such that si ·L s0i ·L ti or ti ·L s0i ·L si.
If f is order-continuous then its values converge on every chain, i.e., totally ordered
subset of S, in decreasing or in increasing direction. That is, for any chain (C;·L) ½
(S;·L),
lim
s2C;s#infC
f (s) = f (infC)
lim
s2C;s"supC
f (s) = f (supC)
fi is increasing on (S¡i;·L) if s¡i ·L t¡i implies fi (s¡i) ·L fi (t¡i); and fi is
decreasing on (S¡i;·L) if s¡i ·L t¡i implies fi (t¡i) ·L fi (s¡i). Note that an indi-
vidual best response function fi is increasing, respectively decreasing, on (S¡i;·L) if
Ui has increasing, respectively decreasing, di¤erences on (S¡i;·L) whereas the converse
statement is not necessarily true.
Remark. ByTopkis’ characterization theorem (Theorem 1.1 in Topkis, 1979), a real-
valued function is submodular (supermodular) on product space L = £mk=1Lk with lattice
structure if and only if it has decreasing (increasing) di¤erences on all Lk, k 2 f1; :::;mg,
while keepingL¡k …xed. Notice that results of this paper may refer to utility functions Ui
that are supermodular on individual strategy sets (Si;·L) but not necessarily on (S;·L).
Moreover, the considered utility functions Ui may have increasing or decreasing utility
di¤erences on (S¡i;·L) but not necessarily on (S;·L). Thus, presuming utility functions
Ui that are supermodular on (Si;·L), while they simultaneously have decreasing utility
di¤erences on (S¡i;·L), does not contradict Topkis’ characterization theorem.
3 Equivalence Results
Iterative solution concepts can be justi…ed by the assumption that players involve in
an internal process of reasoning which succeedingly excludes unreasonable strategies
(see Pearce, 1984; Tan and Werlang, 1988; Guesnerie, 2002 for an epistemic foundation
of iterative solution concepts by the assumption that it is common-knowledge among
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players that players do not choose unreasonable strategies). Rationalizability concepts
(Bernheim, 1984; Moulin, 1984; Pearce, 1984; Börgers, 1993) treat any strategy as
unreasonable if it is not a best response to some belief. These beliefs are either de…ned
as non-additive probability measures (Ghirardato and Le Breton, 1997 and 2000), or as
additive probability measures which may be further restricted to independent- or even
to degenerated probability measures.
Dominance solution concepts (e.g., Moulin, 1984; Milgrom and Roberts, 1990; Börg-
ers 1993) treat a strategy as unreasonable if it is dominated - strongly versus weakly
- by another - mixed versus pure - strategy. Assume, for example, that players only
choose strategies such that no alternative strategy results in a strictly higher utility for
all possible strategies of the player’s opponents. This assumption may e¤ectively elim-
inate some strategies as strongly dominated. In a next step presume that players only
choose strategies such that no alternative strategy gives a strictly higher utility for all
opponents’ strategies surviving the …rst round of elimination. Repeating this argument
gives in the limit the dominance solution of a game, that is, the set of all strategies that
survive iterated elimination of strategies that are strongly dominated.
De…nition: The dominance solution of game G = (Si; Ui)i2I is de…ned as the set
D (G) =
1\
k=0
µk (S)
such that µ0 (S) = S and for all k ¸ 1: for every i 2 I , si 2 µki if and only if there does
not exist some ti 2 µk¡1i such that, for all s¡i 2 µk¡1¡i , Ui (ti; s¡i) > Ui (si; s¡i).
Moreover, game G = (Si; Ui)i2I is called dominance-solvable if and only if there
exists a unique strategy s 2 S such that s 2 D (G).
Point-rationalizability (Bernheim 1984, Moulin 1984, Pearce 1984) starts out with
the assumption that players only choose best responses to some strategy choice of their
opponents. This assumption may e¤ectively eliminate some strategies and in a next step
point-rationalizability requires the players to choose only best responses to the remaining
strategy choices of her opponents. Iteration of this argument gives in the limit the set
of point-rationalizable strategies.
De…nition: The set of point-rationalizable strategies of game G = (Si; Ui)i2I is
de…ned as
P (G) =
1\
k=0
¸k (S)
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such that ¸0 (S) = S and, for all k ¸ 1,
¸k (S) =
[
s2¸k¡1(S)
f (s)
Since point-rationalizability only considers best responses to strategies, i.e., to proba-
bility one beliefs, it is - from a decision theoretic point of view - less convincing than alter-
native rationalizability concepts. However, the great advantage of point-rationalizability
is its technical simplicity which will be later exploited for deriving mathematical con-
ditions guaranteeing dominance-solvability. In what follows, conditions are presented
implying equivalence between dominance solvability and a unique point-rationalizable
strategy.
3.1 Monotonic Utility Di¤erences
My …rst equivalence result generalizes …ndings of Milgrom and Roberts (lemma 1, propo-
sition 5; 1990) to games where some players’ utility functions may have decreasing dif-
ferences.
Lemma 1. Suppose that game G = (Si; Ui)i2I satis…es the following assumptions:
(A1) (Si;·L) is a complete lattice for all i 2 I.
(A2) There exists an order-continuous best response function f.
(A3) Ui is supermodular on (Si;·L) for all i 2 I.
(A4) Ui has either increasing or decreasing utility di¤erences on (S¡i;·L) for all
i 2 I.
Then the set of point-rationalizable strategies, P (G), and the dominance-solution,
D (G), are complete lattices such that the largest (smallest) elements of both sets coincide,
i.e.,
sup P (G) = supD (G) (1)
inf P (G) = infD (G) (2)
Since every point-rationalizable strategy belongs to the dominance solution, lemma
1 immediately implies:
Proposition 1. Suppose that game G = (Si; Ui)i2I satis…es assumptions (A1) -
(A4) of lemma 1. Then G = (Si; Ui)i2I is dominance-solvable if and only if there exists
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a unique point-rationalizable strategy of G = (Si; Ui)i2I, i.e., P (G) = fsg for some
s 2 S.
Remark. Although the assumptions of the lemma imply supP (G) = supD (G)
and inf P (G) = inf D (G) they are not su¢cient for guaranteeing that the set of point-
rationalizable strategies coincides with the dominance-solution, i.e., P (G) =D (G). To
see this, consider the following example of a symmetric two-player game with payo¤-
matrix given by
B
A
b1 b2 b3
a1 1 ² 1 ² 0 ²
a2 0:7 ² 0:7 ² 0:7 ²
a3 0 ² 1 ² 1 ²
Let a1 ·L a2 ·L a3 and b1 ·L b2 ·L b3, and observe that the assumptions of the
lemma are satis…ed. However, while the individual strategy a2 is not a best response to
any pure strategy it is not strictly dominated either. Thus,
supP (G) = supD (G) = (a3; b3)
inf P (G) = infD (G) = (a1; b1)
but, e.g., (a2; b2) is not a point-rationalizable strategy although it belongs to the dominance-
solution.
3.2 Order-quasiconcave Utility Functions
For the second equivalence result I utilize an idea already appearing in Moulin (lemma
2; 1984) who shows for so-called nice games, where individual strategy sets are compact
and convex subsets of the real numbers and utility functions are continuous and strictly
quasiconcave, equivalence between the iterative procedures of the dominance-solution5
and of point-rationalizability.
Lemma 2. Suppose that game G = (Si; Ui)i2I satis…es the following assumptions:
5Moulin (1984) actually considers successive elimination of weakly dominated strategies. However,
as shown in Zimper (2003b), a strategy is weakly dominated in a nice game if and only if it is also
strongly dominated.
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(B1) (Si;·L) is a complete lattice for all i 2 I.
(B2) (Si;·L) is totally ordered for all i 2 I.
(B3) There exists an order-continuous best response function f .
(B4) Ui is order-quasiconcave on (Si;·L) for all i 2 I.
Then the set of point-rationalizable strategies, P (G), and the dominance-solution,
D (G), are complete lattices such that the largest (smallest) elements of both sets coincide,
i.e.,
sup P (G) = supD (G)
inf P (G) = infD (G)
Proposition 2. Suppose that game G = (Si; Ui)i2I satis…es assumptions (B1) -
(B4) of lemma 2. Then G = (Si; Ui)i2I is dominance-solvable if and only if there exists
a unique point-rationalizable strategy of G = (Si; Ui)i2I, i.e., P (G) = fsg for some
s 2 S.
Remark 1. As a relevant generalization of Moulin’s (1984) assumptions, proposition
2 admits totally ordered individual strategy sets that are not convex. However, Moulin’s
convexity-assumption is crucial for proving, by the intermediate value theorem, equiva-
lence in nice games between the dominance solution and the set of point-rationalizable
strategies regardless whether the point-rationalizable solution is unique or not. Note
therefore, that, by dropping Moulin’s (1984) convexity assumption, uniqueness of the
point-rationalizable solution is required to assure equivalence between both iterative
solution concepts in proposition 2.
Remark 2. One might wonder whether assumption (B2) of proposition 2 could be
generalized from totally ordered to just partially ordered individual strategy sets. The
following example shows that this is not the case. Presume players’ payo¤s given by
B
A
b1 b2
(1; 1) 1 ² 1 ²
(1; 2) 2 ² 0 ²
(2; 1) 0 ² 2 ²
(2; 2) 1 ² 1 ²
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For (x1; x2) ; (y1; y2) 2 SA, let (x1; x2) ·L (y1; y2) i¤ x1 · y1 and x2 · y2, and observe
that A’s utility function is order-quasiconcave. Although all assumptions of lemma 2,
except for (B2), are satis…ed, its conclusion is violated since
supP (G) = (2; 1) 6= (2; 2) = supD (G)
inf P (G) = (1; 2) 6= (1; 1) = infD (G)
4 Lattice Games
A lattice game is a game whose strategy set is simultaneously described as a subset of
a metric space (X; d) and as a lattice (S;·L) such that the partial order ·L and the
distance function d : X £ X ! R+ satisfy a particular condition, implying that the
distance between the smallest and the largest element of a complete subset T ½ S is not
smaller than the distance between arbitrary elements in T .
De…nition. G = (Si; Ui)i2I is a lattice game if and only if S is a bounded, non-
empty subset of some metric space (X; d) as well as a complete lattice (S;·L) such that
for all s; s0; t0; t 2 S
s ·L s0; t0 and s0; t0 ·L t implies d (s0; t0) · d (s; t) (3)
Recall that a normed Riesz space is an ordered vector space that is a lattice as
well as a metric space with norm-induced metric, (see, e.g., Aliprantis and Border,
1994). Consequently, whenever all Si are normed Riesz spaces the strategy set S can be
characterized as a lattice and as a subset of a metric space under the max-norm ksk =
maxi2I ksik. Consider the following examples to see that typical individual strategy sets
of economic interest are describable as normed Riesz spaces satisfying condition (3).
Example. Let Si be a subset of the Riesz space B (X ) of all bounded real functions
on X under the supremum-norm ksik1 = supfjsi (x)j j x 2 Xg. Impose the following
lattice structure on Si: si ·L ti if and only if si (x) · ti (x) for all x 2 X. Now suppose
that si ·L s0i; t0i and s0i; t0i ·L ti, and without restricting generality assume further that
kt0i ¡ s0ik1 = supft0i (x)¡ s0i (x) j x 2 Xg. Since ti (x) ¸ t0i (x) and s0i (x) ¸ si (x) for all
x 2 X, it obtains kti ¡ sik1 ¸ kt0i ¡ s0ik1.
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Example. Let Si be a subset of the Riesz space l1 of all continuous real functions
on N with compact support, i.e.,
l1 =
©
si 2 RN j ksik1 <1
ª
which is obviously a special case of the preceding example by letting X = N. Since l1 is
nothing else than the space of sequences with bounded entries, the individual strategy
sets Si can therefore be described for typical settings of dynamic games with in…nite
time-horizon as a lattice and as a subset of a metric space satisfying condition (3),
(compare the ”Arms race”-example of a supermodular game in Milgrom and Roberts,
1990).
Example. Let Si be a subset of the Riesz spaceB ([0; 1]) of all bounded real functions
on [0; 1] under the L1-norm, i.e. ksik =
R 1
0 jsi (x)j dx, such that si and ti are considered
as identical if
R 1
0
jsi (x)¡ ti (x)j dx = 0. Impose the following lattice structure on Si:
si ·L ti if and only if the set fx j si (x) > ti (x)g is of measure zero, (compare Theorem
3 in Milgrom and Roberts, 1990). Now suppose si ·L s0i; t0i and s0i; t0i ·L ti and note thatZ 1
0
ti (x) ¡ s0i (x) dx +
Z 1
0
ti (x) ¡ t0i (x) dx = d (s0i; ti) + d (ti; t0i) ¸ d (s0i; t0i)Z 1
0
t0i (x) ¡ si (x) dx+
Z 1
0
s0i (x) ¡ si (x) dx = d (t0i; si) + d (si; s0i) ¸ d (t0i; s0i)
Summing up the l.h.s and the r.h.s of the above inequalities gives the desired result
2
Z 1
0
ti (x) ¡ si (x) dx ¸ d (s0i; t0i) + d (t0i; s0i)
d (si; ti) ¸ d (s0i; t0i)
Counter-example. Consider Si = [0; 1)[f1:5g with Euclidean metric. Let si ·L ti
if si · ti and observe that Si is a complete lattice satisfying condition (3). Now de…ne
·L by
1:5 · Lsi for all si 2 Si
si · Lti if and only if si · ti for all si; ti 2 [0; 1]
Again, Si is a complete lattice, however, condition (3) is not satis…ed.
5 Technical Main Results: Dominance-Solvability
This section presents the main …ndings of this paper which refer to contraction properties
of the game’s best response function. Let f 0 (s) = s and de…ne for a given best response
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function f : S ! S the function fk : S ! S such that, for all k 2 N, fk (s) =
f
¡
f k¡1 (s)
¢
.
Proposition 3: Consider a lattice game G= (Si; Ui)i2I satisfying assumptions (A1)
- (A4) of lemma 1 or assumptions (B1) - (B4) of lemma 2.
Then the following two statements are equivalent:
(i) G = (Si; Ui)i2I is dominance-solvable.
(ii) There exists for all s; t 2 S, with s 6= t, some k 2 N dependent on s; t, such that
d
¡
fk (s) ; fk (t)
¢
< d (s; t).
Call a best response function f T-contractive if and only if f T, with T 2 N, is a con-
tractive mapping, that is, for all s; t 2 S with s 6= t, d¡fT (s) ; fT (t)¢ < d (s; t). For T-
contractive f statement (ii) in proposition 2 is trivially satis…ed since d
¡
f T (s) ; f T (t)
¢
<
d (s; t) for number T 2 N being the same for all s; t 2 S with s 6= t. For real valued and
continuously di¤erentiable individual best response functions T-contractivity of f can be
veri…ed by properties of the partial derivatives of f T whose values are easily computed,
for all s 2 S , via successive application of the chain-rule:
@f 1i
@sj
(s) =
@fi
@sj
(s)
@fTi
@sj
(s) =
X
k6=i
@fi
@sk
@f T¡1k
@sj
(s) for T ¸ 2
Corollary: Consider a game G = (Si; Ui)i2I such that, for all i 2 I,
(C1) Si is a non-empty, compact, and convex subset of R.
(C2) fi is continuously di¤erentiable.
(C3a) Ui has either increasing or decreasing utility di¤erences on (S¡i;·L) where
·L denotes the natural order · on R.
or (C3b) Ui is quasiconcave on (Si;·L) where ·L denotes the natural order · on
R.
Then G = (Si;Ui)i2I is dominance-solvable
if there exists a T ¸ 1 such that, for all i 2 I and all s 2 S ,X
j2I
¯¯¯¯
@f Ti
@sj
(s)
¯¯¯¯
< 1 (4)
or if there exists a T ¸ 1 such that, for all j 2 I and all s 2 S ,X
i2I
¯¯¯¯
@f Ti
@sj
(s)
¯¯¯¯
< 1 (5)
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For the special case T = 1, Moulin (Theorem 4, 1984) already proves that an equiv-
alent formulation of condition (4) - in terms of second-order partial derivatives of the
utility function - implies dominance-solvability of nice games (which satisfy assumptions
(C1), (C2), and (C3b) of the corollary).
If best response functions are monotonic and move, furthermore, for all players in
the same direction, a simple characterization of dominance-solvability can be obtained
which only refers to the smallest and largest strategy in strategy set S.
Proposition 4: Consider a lattice game G= (Si; Ui)i2I satisfying assumptions (A1)
- (A4) of lemma 1 or assumptions (B1) - (B4) of lemma 2. If either, for all i 2 I, the
individual best response function fi is increasing or, for all i 2 I, fi is decreasing, then
the following two statements are equivalent:
(i) G = (Si; Ui)i2I is dominance-solvable.
(ii) limk!1 d
¡
fk (s) ; fk (t)
¢
= 0, where s denotes the smallest and t denotes the
largest element in S .
The proof of proposition 4 immediately implies the following restatement of a …nding
of Milgrom and Roberts who characterize dominance-solvability of supermodular games
by uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium.
Observation 1 (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990): Consider a lattice game G= (Si; Ui)i2I
satisfying the assumptions (A1) - (A4) of lemma 1. If, for all i 2 I, the utility di¤er-
ences are increasing then there exists a smallest strategy s 2 D (G) and a largest strategy
t 2 D (G) such that f (s) = s and f (t) = t, i.e., s and t are Nash equilibria. Conse-
quently, G= (Si; Ui)i2I is dominance-solvable if and only if G= (Si; Ui)i2I has a unique
Nash equilibrium.
Since a supermodular game exhibits increasing best response functions, observation
1 implies that statement (ii) of proposition 4 characterizes a unique Nash equilibrium for
supermodular games that are also lattice games. In addition to supermodular games, as
considered by Milgrom and Roberts (1990), proposition 4 also applies to games where all
players have decreasing best response functions. The following observation 2, implied by
the proofs of lemma 1 and proposition 4, demonstrates that the conclusion of observation
1 is not valid for lattice games that are not supermodular. Moreover, observation 2
shows why - in contrast to supermodular games - uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium
does not necessarily imply dominance-solvability of games if players have decreasing
18
utility di¤erences (as observed by Bernheim (1984) for n-…rm Cournot oligopolies).
Observation 2: Consider a lattice game G = (Si; Ui)i2I satisfying the assumptions
(A1) - (A4) of lemma 1. If, for all i 2 I , the utility di¤erences are decreasing then there
exists a smallest strategy s 2 D (G) and a largest strategy t 2 D (G) such that f (s) = t,
f2 (s) = s and f (t) = s, f 2 (t) = t, i.e., s and t are Nash equilibria of G = (Si; Ui)i2I
if and only if G= (Si; Ui)i2I is dominance-solvable.
Remark. In the light of the proof of proposition 4, statement (ii) of proposition 4
provides a su¢cient and necessary condition for a unique point-rationalizable strategy
in lattice games with monotonic best response functions. However, in contrast to the
stronger assumption of decreasing utility di¤erences, the assumption of monotonic best
response functions is not su¢cient to also guarantee dominance-solvability. To see this,
consider the following game with payo¤ matrix
B
A
b1 b2
a1 2; 0 2; 3
a2 0; 2 3; 0
a3 3; 3 0; 2
Let a1 ·L a2 ·L a3 and b1 ·L b2, and impose the discrete metric on SA and on SB,
to obtain a lattice game, which exhibits decreasing best response functions. Strategy
(a3; b1) is the unique point-rationalizable strategy of this lattice game (e.g., statement
(ii) of proposition 2 is satis…ed for k = 3), however, all strategies of this game belong
to the dominance solution. Note that there are neither monotonic utility di¤erences nor
order-quasiconcave utility functions.
6 Dominance-solvable n-Firm Cournot Oligopolies
For the classical n-…rm Cournot oligopoly - presuming a linear inverse demand function,
constant marginal costs, and products that are perfect substitutes - a unique Nash
equilibrium exists for any number n of …rms. However, Bernheim (1984) observes that
any output-decision of a …rm, ranging between zero and the monopoly-output, is a
point-rationalizable strategy if there belong more than two …rms to an n-…rm Cournot
oligopoly. In another line of research, the application of lattice theory to the analysis of
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strategic solutions of n-…rm Cournot oligopolies is restricted (for an exception see Amir,
1996) to Cournot duopolies only, because typical n-…rm Cournot oligopolies with more
than two …rms are not supermodular games (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990; Vives, 1990).
6.1 Relaxing the Perfect Substitute Assumption
This section introduces a simple model of an n-…rm Cournot oligopoly where the perfect
substitute assumption is weakened and, by an application of this paper’s theoretical
…ndings, conditions are identi…ed which guarantee dominance-solvability. Contrary to
Bernheim’s (1984) observation, iterative solution concepts therefore re-gain maximal
predictive power for n-…rm Cournot oligopolies if the according conditions are satis…ed.
Moreover, the application of lattice theory proves fruitful to n-…rm Cournot oligopolies
that are not supermodular games.
De…nition. Call a game G = (Si; Ui)i2I an n-…rm Cournot oligopoly with imperfect
substitutes if, for all i 2 I = f1; ::ng, Si = [0; 1] and
Ui (s) = Pi (s) ¢ si ¡ cisi
such that, for all i 2 I, ci 2 (0; 1) and, for all s 2 S,
Pi (s) = max
(
0;
Ã
1¡
X
j 6=i
¯ijsj ¡ si
!)
where, for all j 6= i, ¯ij 2 [0; 1].
The individual strategy set Si stands here for the possible output-decisions of …rm
i 2 I . Function Pi : S ! [0; 1] is interpreted as the inverse demand function for the
product of …rm i 2 I which determines, for a given market output, the maximal price
…rm i 2 I can charge pro-unit of its product. Furthermore, the number ci denotes the
constant pro-unit production costs of …rm i 2 I.
If ¯ij = 1, for all i 6= j , the above de…nition of an n-…rm Cournot oligopoly with
imperfect substitutes coincides with the classical n-…rm Cournot oligopoly as considered
by Bernheim (1984). However, if, for some i 6= j, ¯ij 6= 1 the product of …rm j is
not anylonger a perfect substitute for the product of …rm i since one-unit output of
…rm j in‡uences the residual demand for the product of …rm i di¤erently than one-
unit output of …rm i. Such an n-…rm Cournot oligopoly could be interpreted as a
model of oligopolistic competition on n di¤erent home-markets where each …rm i su¤ers
some negative externality - measured by ¯ij - on its home-market from …rm j’s output.
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Obviously, the smaller the externality weight ¯ij the greater …rm i’s market-power on
its home-market (in the extreme case ¯ij = 0 for all j 6= i, implying that …rm i has
a monopoly on its home-market). Since …rms rarely compete with products that are
perfect substitutes the introduction of externality-weights has, in my opinion, realistic
appeal.
Note that the n-…rm Cournot oligopoly, as de…ned above, is a lattice game that
satis…es all assumptions of proposition 2 if the lattice order ·Lis taken to be the standard
order · on R. To see that the utility di¤erences are decreasing verify that, for all i 2 I
and for all ti ·L si, Ui (si; s¡i) ¡ Ui (ti; s¡i) is non-increasing in s¡i if and only ifÃX
j 6=i
¯ijsj
!
¢ (ti ¡ si)
is non-increasing in s¡i - which is obviously satis…ed since (ti ¡ si) is non-positive. Ba-
sically an application of the corollary shows then that a su¢ciently small impact of
competitors on …rms’ home-markets assures dominance-solvability of n-…rm Cournot
oligopolies.
Proposition 5: An n-…rm Cournot oligopoly with imperfect substitutes is dominance-
solvable if, for all i 2 I, X
j 6=i
¯ij < 2 (6)
or if, for all j 6= i, X
i2I
¯ij < 2 (7)
In the case of the classical n-…rm Cournot oligopoly, where products are perfect
substitutes, i.e., for all i; j 2 I , ¯ij = 1, conditions (6) and (7) are violated for more
than two …rms. However, in the case of three …rms condition (6) is already satis…ed if,
for all i; j 2 I, ¯ij < 1. Thus, Bernheim’s (1984) observation that in an n-…rm Cournot
oligopoly with three …rms every output-decision between zero and the monopoly output
belongs to the dominance-solution, is not any longer valid if a marginal deviation from
the perfect substitute assumption is considered.
6.2 Large Markets and Quadratic Cost Functions
Börgers and Janssen (1995) investigate dominance-solvability of an n-…rm Cournot
oligopoly under the assumption of large markets where an increase in the number of
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…rms is matched by an increase in market size. In particular, let n be the number of
…rms then Börgers and Janssen speak of an n-th Cournot game if the inverse demand
function is given by Pn (s) = P (s=n) where P is the inverse demand function of the
unreplicated game. Motivated by the fact that, with increasing n, an n-th Cournot
game converges towards a perfectly competitive market whose Walrasian equilibrium
may be approached by a so-called cobweb-process, Börgers and Janssen 1995 show that
if the cobweb process is strictly globally stable (cf. Börgers and Janssen, 1995) an n-th
Cournot game is dominance-solvable for su¢ciently great n.
The following model of a large market n-…rm Cournot oligopoly adopts Börgers
and Janssen’s (1995) de…nition of a large market to a n-…rm Cournot oligopoly with
linear inverse demand function where products are - as in the classical model - perfect
substitutes. Under the assumption of quadratic cost functions, conditions on the market
size, n, are identi…ed which guarantee dominance-solvability.
De…nition. Call a game G = (Si; Ui)i2I a large market n-…rm Cournot oligopoly
with quadratic cost function if, for all i 2 I = f1; ::ng, Si = [0; 1] and
Ui (s) = Pi (s) ¢ si ¡ c ¢ (si)2
such that, for all i 2 I, ci 2 (0; 1) and, for all s 2 S,
Pi (s) = max
(
0;
Ã
1 ¡ 1
n
nX
j=1
sj
!)
Presuming the standard order of the real numbers and, e.g., the metric induced by
the absolute-value norm, the large market n-…rm Cournot oligopoly with quadratic cost
function is a lattice game satisfying assumption (A1) - supermodularity - and assumption
(A2) - decreasing utility di¤erences - of proposition 1.
Proposition 6:
If c ¸ 1
2
then, for any n 2 N, a large market n-…rm Cournot oligopoly with quadratic
cost function is dominance-solvable .
If c < 12 then the large market n-…rm Cournot oligopoly with quadratic cost function
is dominance-solvable if the market size n 2 N satis…es
n <
1
0:5¡ c (8)
i.e., if n 2 N is su¢ciently small.
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As the second statement of proposition 6 shows, an increase in market size increases
the di¢culty for satisfying condition (8). Therefore, rather the assumption of convenient
cost functions than the large market assumption assures here for the n-…rm Cournot
oligopoly dominance-solvability.
7 Dominance-solvable Auctions with Optimistic - re-
spectively Pessimistic - Bidders
Imagine that pessimistic bidders consider themselves as handicapped by the - unknown
- allocation rule by believing that they have to make higher monetary bids than their
competitors in order to win the good. Analogously, optimistic bidders think they are
favored by the allocation rule so that they expect to win even if they bid less money
than their competitors. It will be assumed that bidders strongly prefer to obtain the
good with - subjectively believed - certainty whereas they strongly abhor to certainly
not obtaining the good. Moreover, if bidders can not a¤ord bids as high as to win the
auction with certainty they still o¤er the highest bid possible in order to have maximal
- as subjectively perceived - chances of winning. Instead of providing any axiomatic
foundation, which would give rise to such decision making under uncertainty, I simply
presume utility functions that are consistent with the described behavior.
In particular, each bidder i 2 I o¤ers a monetary amount si 2 [0; 1] - her bid - which
she has to pay if she wins the good, and each bidder’ utility - measured in monetary
units - of winning the good is given by Wi > 1. Each bidder presumes she has no
chance of winning if she bids less than the threshold amount b > 0 - believed to be
the auction-organizer’s reservation prize. A pessimistic bidder believes with certainty
that she obtains the good if her bid meets at least the maximal bid of her opponents,
denoted max s¡i, times some pessimism-factor ° > 1. Similarly, an optimistic bidder
believes with certainty that she obtains the good if her bid at least equals the maximal
bid of her opponents times some optimism-factor ° < 1.
De…nition. Consider a game G = (Si; Ui)i2I such that, for all i 2 I , Si = [0; 1] and
Ui (si; s¡i) = Wi ¡ si if max fb; ° ¢max s¡ig · si
Ui (si; s¡i) = Wi ¡ si if si = 1 and 1 < ° ¢max s¡i
Ui (si; s¡i) = 0 if si < 1 and 1 < ° ¢max s¡i
Ui (si; s¡i) = 0 if si < max fb; ° ¢max s¡ig
where b 2 (0; 1) and ° 2 R+.
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Call G = (Si; Ui)i2I a simple auction with optimistic bidders if ° < 1.
Call G = (Si; Ui)i2I a simple auction with pessimistic bidders if 1 < °.
For example, in a simple two-player auction a pessimistic bidder with pessimism-
factor ° = 1:2 wants to o¤er 20 percent more than her competitor if this bid exceeds b.
However, if, due to budget constraints, this pessimistic bidder can not a¤ord to o¤er 20
percent more than her competitor she bids the maximal amount allowed by her budget
constraints to maintain a ”maximal chance” of winning.
In general, the individual best response functions in simple auctions with optimistic
- respectively pessimistic - bidders are given as follows, for all i 2 I,
fi (s¡i) = 1 if 1 < ° ¢max s¡i
fi (s¡i) = ° ¢max s¡i if b · ° ¢max s¡i · 1
fi (s¡i) = b if ° ¢max s¡i < b
Presuming the standard order of the real numbers, these best response functions are
increasing and order-continuous. However, despite increasing best response functions,
simple auctions with optimistic - respectively pessimistic - bidders are not supermodular
games since utility di¤erences are not increasing. The intuition for bids being only partial
strategic complementarities is straightforward: A bidder gains utility by increasing her
bid as long as this bidding is decisive for winning the good, but if the high bid is not
anylonger decisive it diminishes utility since then high bidding increases the amount
to pay in the case of winning. Although the assumptions of lemma 1 are therefore
not satis…ed, simple auctions with optimistic - respectively pessimistic - bidders can be
described as lattice games satisfying the assumptions of lemma 2 since utility functions
are order-quasiconcave.
For the above auction environment, it is intuitively clear that pessimistic bidders
rather tend to higher bids than optimistic bidders. The contribution of proposition 7
is to show, that the strategic logic of dominance-solvability brings this tendency to the
extreme: whereas pessimistic bidders go to their budgetary limit for winning the good,
optimistic bidders just bid the reservation price.
Proposition 7:
A simple auction with pessimistic bidders is dominance-solvable and the dominance
solution, fs¤g =D (G), is given by
s¤ = (1; :::; 1)
24
A simple auction with optimistic bidders is dominance-solvable and the dominance
solution, fs¤g =D (G), is given by
s¤ = (b; :::; b)
8 A Dominance-solvable Two-Player Model of Bank-
Runs
This section introduces a simple Two-player Bayesian model of bank runs. Both in-
vestors privately observe a signal - independently drawn from a uniform distribution
over [0; 1] - that determines their types before they either decide to withdraw or to
not withdraw money from the bank. Instead of o¤ering a particular interpretation
of these types - e.g., a measure of the investment project’s success (as in Goldstein and
Pauzner, 2002) or as the investor’s preferences for intertemporal consumption (e.g., the
investor’s life span in Postlewaite and Vives, 1987) - I simply presume, in accordance
with the literature, that for any given action of her opponent the utility of not with-
drawing increases with the investor’s type. Another stylized fact of bank run models
is captured by the assumption that the utility of not withdrawing is higher6 when
the opponent also chooses not withdrawing than when she chooses withdrawing.
Given some number r 2 (0; 1), consider a symmetric Two-player Bayesian game
where player A’s payo¤s, for realized type µA 2 £A = [0; 1], depend on opponent B’s
decision as follows:
B
A
not withdraw withdraw
not withdraw 2 ¢ µA µA
withdraw 1 r
Thus, whenever A receives signal µA >max f0:5; rg her strictly dominant action is to
not withdraw. Conversely, for signals µA <min f0:5; rg to withdraw strictly dom-
inates to not withdraw. For remaining signals, i.e., minf0:5; rg · µA · max f0:5; rg,
a coordination problem arises since then a player’s optimal action depends on the action
of her opponent. For example, if 0:5 · µA · r then A prefers to withdraw when B
6Here simply to be taken as twice as high.
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withdraws whereas A prefers not withdraw when B chooses to not withdraw.
If instead r · µA · 0:5 then A prefers to withdraw when B does not withdraw,
and she prefers to not withdraw when B withdraws.
For i 2 fA;Bg, de…ne a switching strategy si as a map
si : [0; 1] ! fwithdraw,not withdrawg
such that, for some cuto¤-point ¾i 2 [0; 1],
si (x) =
(
withdraw if x · ¾i
not withdraw if ¾i < x
Denote by Si the set of all switching strategies of player i, and observe that every
switching strategy si 2 Si is completely characterized by its cuto¤-point ¾i 2 [0; 1]. The
assumption of a uniform-distribution implies that if player A expects B to choose switch-
ing strategy sB with cuto¤-point ¾B, then A expects B to withdraw with probability
¾B.
Suppose that players are risk-neutral expected utility maximizers. Then the above
payo¤-speci…cation implies for A’s type-dependent utility function UA : £A£SA£SB !
R+ that
UA (µA; sA; sB) =
(
2 ¢ µA ¢ (1¡ ¾B) + µA ¢ ¾B if ¾A · µA
1 ¢ (1 ¡ ¾B) + r ¢ ¾B if µA < ¾A
(9)
where ¾A (¾B) denotes the cuto¤-point of strategy sA (sB). Moreover, the ex-ante
expected utility - before learning her type - of player A is given by
UA (sA; sB) =
Z 1
0
UA (µA; sA; sB) dµA (10)
=
Z ¾A
0
1 ¢ (1¡ ¾B) + r ¢ ¾BdµA
+
Z 1
¾A
2 ¢ µA ¢ (1¡ ¾B) + µA ¢ ¾BdµA
= 1 ¢ (1¡ ¾B) ¢ ¾A + r ¢ ¾B ¢ ¾A
+ (1¡ ¾B) ¢
¡
1 ¡ ¾2A
¢
+
1
2
¢ ¾B ¢
¡
1 ¡¾2A
¢
De…nition. Call a game G = (Si; Ui)i2I a Two-Player Bayesian model of bank runs
if, for all i 2 fA;Bg, Si is the set of switching strategies as de…ned by (9), and Ui is
the ex-ante expected utility of player i as de…ned by (10).
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For all i 2 fA;Bg, let ti ·L si if their cuto¤-points satisfy ¿ i · ¾i, and endow Si
with the metric d (si; ti) = j¾i ¡ ¿ ij, thereby describing any Two-Player Bayesian model
of bank runs as a lattice game with totally ordered individual strategy sets. Presume
tA ·L sA and calculate as utility di¤erences
UA (sA; sB) ¡UA (tA; sB) = [1¡ ¾B + r ¢ ¾B] ¢ (¾A ¡ ¿A)¡
µ
1 +
1
2
¢ ¾B
¶
¢ ¡¾2A¡ ¿ 2A¢
implying
@
@¾B
[UA (sA; sB)¡ UA (tA; sB)] · 0,
r +
1
2
¢ (¾A+ ¿A) · 1
Thus, for every r 2 (0; 1), there exist, on the one hand, some large tA; sA 2 SA with
tA ·L sA such that A’s utility di¤erences are increasing in sB, while there also exist, on
the other hand, some small tA; sA 2 SA with tA ·L sA such that A’s utility di¤erences
are decreasing in sB. Switching strategies in any Two-Player Bayesian model of bank
runs are therefore only partial strategic complementarities; a situation that is typical
for bank-run models (compare, e.g., Goldstein and Pauzner, 2002).
While Two-Player Bayesian models of bank runs do not admit monotonic utility
di¤erences, they imply order-quasiconcave utility functions. To see this, note that
@UA (sA; sB)
@¾A
= (1 ¡ ¾B) + r ¢ ¾B ¡ 2¾A + ¾B ¢ ¾A · 0,
(1¡ ¾B) + r ¢ ¾B
2¡ ¾B · ¾A
i.e., for given r 2 (0; 1) and ¾B 2 [0; 1], UA increases in lattice-order in sA until cuto¤-
point
¾¤A =
(1 ¡ ¾B) + r ¢ ¾B
2¡ ¾B
(11)
while it decreases afterwards.
Proposition 8: For any r 2 (0; 1), a Two-Player Bayesian model of bank runs is
dominance-solvable and the dominance solution, fs¤g = D (G), is characterized by the
cuto¤-points
¾¤i =
3
2
¡ 1
2
¢ r ¡ 1
2
¢
p
(5 ¡ 6 ¢ r + r2)
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for i 2 fA;Bg. As the likelihood of bank runs where both investors withdraw therefore
obtains
¾¤A ¢ ¾¤B =
1
4
h
¡3 + r +
p
(5 ¡ 6 ¢ r + r2)
i2
which is, of course, increasing in r.
9 Appendix
Proof of the lemma:
Step 1. I start by proving, for all k ¸ 0,
sup¸k (S) = sup µk (S) (12)
inf ¸k (S) = inf µk (S) (13)
At …rst verify that sup ¸k (S) and inf ¸k (S) exist for all k ¸ 0 since, by completeness of (S; ·L),
there must exist a largest and a smallest element of S, i.e., sup ¸0 (S) and inf ¸0 (S). Presume that
sup ¸k¡1 (S) and inf ¸k¡1 (S) exist and observe that
sup ¸ki (S) = fi
³
inf ¸k¡1¡i (S)
´
inf ¸ki (S) = fi
³
sup ¸k¡1¡i (S)
´
if Ui has decreasing di¤erences; and
sup¸ki (S) = fi
³
sup¸k¡1¡i (S)
´
(14)
inf ¸ki (S) = fi
³
inf ¸k¡1¡i (S)
´
(15)
if Ui has increasing di¤erences. Thus, by induction, monotonic individual best response functions imply
existence of sup ¸k (S) and inf ¸k (S) for all k ¸ 1.
Now suppose player i 2 I has decreasing utility di¤erences on (S¡i; ·L), (for players with in-
creasing utility di¤erences compare the proof of lemma 1 in Milgrom and Roberts, 1990). Given an
interval [s¡i; t¡i ] such that s¡i ·L t¡i , let µi [s¡i; t¡i ] denote the set of undominated strategies and let
¸i [s¡i ; t¡i] denote the set of best responses to elements in [s¡i; t¡i]. Simply write s^i for sup fi (s¡i)
and ·si for inf fi (t¡i) where existence of sup fi (s¡i) and inf fi (t¡i) is assured by (14) and (15). Observe
that any ri with ri £L s^i is strongly dominated by the strategy s^i ^ ri since, for all x¡i 2 [s¡i; t¡i ],
Ui (ri; x¡i) ¡ Ui (s^i ^ ri ; x¡i) · Ui (ri; s¡i) ¡ Ui (s^i ^ ri; s¡i) by (A2)
· Ui (s^i _ ri ; s¡i) ¡ Ui (s^i ;s¡i) by (A1)
< 0
where the last inequality results from s^i 2 fi (s¡i) and s^i <L s^i _ ri , i.e., s^i _ ri =2 fi (s¡i). This
proves ri ·L s^i for any ri 2 µi [s¡i ; t¡i]. Accordingly, it can be shown that any strategy ri with
·si £L ri is dominated by a strategy ·si _ ri. Consequently, ·si ·L ri for any ri 2 µi [s¡i ; t¡i]. The set-
inclusion ¸i [s¡i; t¡i] ½ µi [s¡i ; t¡i] then implies sup¸i [s¡i; t¡i ] = supµi [s¡i; t¡i ] and inf ¸i [s¡i ; t¡i] =
inf µi [s¡i; t¡i] for any interval [s¡i ; t¡i] with s¡i ·L t¡i .
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Step 2. It remains to prove that the equations (12) and (13) indeed entail (1) and (2).
By set-inclusion, the sequences
n
inf µk (S)
o
k¸0
,
n
supµk (S)
o
k¸0
are monotonically increasing, re-
spectively decreasing. Completeness of S implies then existence of order-limits such that
lim
k!1 inf µ
k (S) = lim
k!1 inf ¸
k (S) = ·s
lim
k!1
supµk (S) = lim
k!1
sup¸k (S) = s^
by (13) and (12). Moreover, by de…nition of P (G) and D (G)
P (G) ½ D (G) ½ [·s; s^]
and, therefore, ·s; s^ 2 P (G) would prove the claim. I proceed by showing that all s^i are either best
responses to s^¡i or to ·s¡i and that all ·si are either best responses to s^¡i or to ·s¡i, thereby implying
·s; s^ 2 P (G).
By order-continuity of f
lim
k!1
f
³
inf ¸k (S)
´
= f (·s) , lim
k!1
f
³
sup¸k (S)
´
= f (s^)
i.e., for all i 2 I ,
lim
k!1fi
³
inf ¸k¡i (S)
´
= fi (·s¡i) , lim
k!1 fi
³
sup¸k¡i (S)
´
= fi (s^¡i)
Moreover, if player i 2 I has decreasing utility di¤erences
lim
k!1
fi
³
inf ¸k¡i (S)
´
= lim
k!1
sup¸k+1i (S) = s^i
lim
k!1 fi
³
sup¸k¡i (S)
´
= lim
k!1 inf ¸
k+1
i (S) = ·si
implying fi (·s¡i) = s^i and fi (s^¡i) = ·si , i.e., s^i (·si) is a best response to ·s¡i ( s^¡i).
Similarly, if player i 2 I has increasing utility di¤erences
lim
k!1fi
³
inf ¸k¡i (S)
´
= lim
k!1 inf ¸
k+1
i (S) = ·si
lim
k!1
fi
³
sup ¸k¡i (S)
´
= lim
k!1
sup ¸k+1i (S) = s^i
That is, s^i (·si) is a best response to s^¡i (·s¡i).¤
Proof of proposition 2:
Proceed as in the proof of lemma 1 to see that sup ¸k (S) and inf ¸k (S) exist for all k ¸ 0. Moreover,
since
sup ¸0 (S) = sup µ0 (S)
inf ¸0 (S) = inf µ0 (S)
presume
sup ¸k¡1 (S) = sup µk¡1 (S)
inf ¸k¡1 (S) = inf µk¡1 (S)
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and proceed by proving, for an arbitrary i 2 I ,
sup¸ki (S) = sup µ
k
i (S) (16)
inf ¸ki (S) = inf µ
k
i (S) (17)
Abbreviate s^i = sup ¸
k
i (S) and ·si = inf ¸
k
i (S). Since any ri 2 Si, satisfying ri <L ·si or s^i <L ri, is, by
assumption, no best response to any strategy s¡i 2 ¸k¡1¡i (S) there exists for every s¡i 2 ¸k¡1¡i (S) some
s0i 2 ¸ki (S) such that
Ui (s
0
i ;s¡i) > Ui (ri ;s¡i)
By assumption, Si , and therefore ¸
k
i (S), is a chain, i.e., ·si ·L s0i ·L s^i for all s0i 2 ¸ki (S). Order-
quasiconcavity then implies, for all s¡i 2 ¸k¡1¡i (S),
Ui (s^i ;s¡i) > Ui (ri ;s¡i)
if s^i <L ri , and
Ui (·si ;s¡i) > Ui (ri ;s¡i)
if ri <L ·si. Thus, any ri 2 Si , satisfying ri <L ·si ( s^i <L ri) is strongly dominated by ·si (s^i), which
proves (16) and (17).
By set-inclusion, the sequences
n
inf µk (S)
o
k¸0
,
n
supµk (S)
o
k¸0
are monotonically increasing, re-
spectively decreasing. Completeness of S implies existence of order-limits such that
lim
k!1
inf µk (S) = lim
k!1
inf ¸k (S) = ·s
lim
k!1 supµ
k (S) = lim
k!1 sup¸
k (S) = s^
Since, by assumption, ·s = s^
P (G) ½ D (G) ½ f·sg
Finally, observe that P (G) is non-empty, i.e., P (G) = D (G) = f·sg, because order-continuity of f
implies f (·s) = ·s.¤
Proof of proposition 3: First I demonstrate that statement (ii) characterizes uniqueness of
point-rationalizable strategies for lattice games with order-continuous best response function.
(ii) implies (i). By lattice-completeness of S and order-continuity of f there exist for all k ¸ 1
strategies sk; tk 2 ¸k (S) such that, for all s0 2 ¸k (S), sk ·L s0 ·L tk . Thus, by condition (3),
for all k ¸ 0, diam
³
¸k (S)
´
= d
¡
sk ; tk
¢
. Observe that, by set-inclusion,
¡
tk
¢
k¸1 is a monotonically
decreasing sequence bounded from below, and
¡
sk
¢
k¸1 is a monotonically increasing sequence bounded
from above. Since S is order-complete the order-limits t¤ = inf tk and s¤ = sup sk exist and, by
condition (3), diam (P (G)) = d (s¤; t¤) . However, since, for all k ¸ 1, fk is order-continuous it is also
true that diam (P (G)) = d
¡
fk (s¤ ) ; fk (t¤ )
¢
for any k ¸ 1. Consequently, P (G) must be single-valued
if there exists for every pair of strategies s 6= t some …nite k such that d ¡fk (s) ; fk (t)¢ < d (s; t).
(i) implies (ii). Suppose, on the contrary, that statement (ii) is violated such that there exist some
s0; t0 2 S, with s0 6= t0, and limk!1 d
¡
s 0k; t0k
¢
> 0. But then, by set-inclusion,
diam (P (G)) = d (s¤; t¤) ¸ lim
k!1
d
¡
s 0k; t0k
¢
> 0
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implying s¤ 6= t¤. Thus, P (G) is not single-valued.
Finally note, that the assumptions of proposition 3 assure, by proposition 1, that G = (Si; Ui)i2I
is dominance-solvable if and only if G = (Si ; Ui)i2I has a unique point-rationalizable strategy. ¤
Proof of the corollary:
Part A. Let gi (¸) = fTi (¸ (s ¡ t) + t), and observe that gi (¸) is continuously di¤erentiable on
[0; 1]. The mean-value inequality for real-valued functions with a real-valued domain implies
jgi (1) ¡ gi (0)j ·
¯¯¯
¯@gi@¸ (¸¤ )
¯¯¯
¯ ¢ j1 ¡ 0j (18)
for some ¸¤ such that ¸¤ = arg max[0;1]
¯¯¯
@gi
@¸
(¸)
¯¯¯
. By an application of the chain-rule:
@gi
@¸
(¸¤) =
X
j2I
@fTi
@sj
(¸¤ (sj ¡ tj ) + tj) ¢ (sj ¡ tj )
¯¯¯
¯@gi@¸ (¸¤)
¯¯¯
¯ ·
¯¯¯
¯¯¯X
j2I
@fTi
@sj
(¸¤ (sj ¡ tj ) + tj )
¯¯¯
¯¯¯ ¢ ks ¡ tk1
Substituting for the terms in inequality (18):
¯¯
fTi (s) ¡ fTi (t)
¯¯ ·
¯¯¯
¯¯¯X
j2I
@fTi
@sj
(r)
¯¯¯
¯¯¯ ¢ ks ¡ tk1
with r = ¸¤ (s ¡ t) + t. Since this is true by assumption for all i 2 I we obtain for the supremum norm
°°fT (s) ¡ fT (t)°°1 ·
¯¯¯
¯¯¯X
j2I
@fTi
@sj
(r)
¯¯¯
¯¯¯ ¢ ks ¡ tk1
Consequently, condition (4) of the corollary implies T-contraction of f in the supremum norm.
Note that T-contraction, and not just T-contractivity, is satis…ed because
P
j2I
¯¯¯
@fTi
@ sj
(s)
¯¯¯
is a con-
tinuous function obtaining a maximum on the compact set S. Consequently, if
P
j2I
¯¯¯
@fTi
@sj
(s)
¯¯¯
< 1 for
all i and all s 2 S then there exists some c < 1 such that Pj2I ¯¯¯ @f Ti@sj (s)¯¯¯ · c for all i.
Part B. Let again gi (¸) = fTi (¸ (s ¡ t) + t), and observe that the mean-value inequality implies
jgi (1) ¡ gi (0)j ·
¯¯¯
¯@gi@¸ ¡¸i¢
¯¯¯
¯ ¢ j1 ¡ 0j
for some ¸i = arg max[0;1]
¯¯¯
@gi
@¸ (¸)
¯¯¯
. By the chain-rule and substitution
¯¯
fTi (s) ¡ fTi (t)
¯¯ ·
¯¯¯¯
¯¯X
j2I
@fTi
@sj
¡
ri
¢ ¢ (sj ¡ tj )
¯¯¯¯
¯¯
with ri = ¸is +
¡
1 ¡ ¸i¢ t. Summing up over all i and rearranging
X
i2I
¯¯
fTi (s) ¡ fTi (t)
¯¯ · X
i2I
¯¯¯
¯¯¯X
j2I
µ
@fTi
@sj
¡
r i
¢¶ ¢ (sj ¡ tj )
¯¯¯
¯¯¯
X
i2I
¯¯
fTi (s) ¡ fTi (t)
¯¯ · max
j2I
(¯¯¯¯¯X
i2I
µ
@fTi
@sj
¡
r i
¢¶¯¯¯¯¯) ¢ X
j2I
jsj ¡ tjj°°fT (s) ¡ fT (t)°°
1
< ks ¡ tk1
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Where the last step follows from the assumption, for all j and all ri 2 f¸s + (1 ¡ ¸) t j ¸ 2 [0; 1]g,
X
i2I
µ
@fTi
@sj
¡
r i
¢¶
< 1
Consequently, d
¡
fT (s) ; fT (t)
¢
< d (s; t) with d induced by the absolute value norm. Thus, condition
(5) of the corollary implies T-contraction in the absolute value norm.¤
Proof of proposition 4: By the proof of proposition 3 the point-rationalizable strategy of G =
(Si ;Ui)i2I is unique if and only if limk!1 d
¡
sk; tk
¢
= 0 where, for all k ¸ 1, sk ; tk 2 ¸k (S) such that,
for all s0 2 ¸k (S), sk ·L s0 ·L tk .
If all players best response functions are increasing then, for all k ¸ 1, sk = f ¡sk¡1¢ and tk =
f
¡
tk¡1
¢
. Consequently, limk!1 d
¡
sk ; tk
¢
= 0 if and only if limk!1 d
¡
fk (s) ; fk (t)
¢
= 0, where s
denotes the smallest and t denotes the largest element in S.
Analogously, if all players have decreasing best response functions then, for all k ¸ 1, sk = f ¡tk¡1¢
and tk = f
¡
sk¡1
¢
. Thus, for k0 = 1; 3;5; :::, limk0!1 d
³
sk
0
; tk
0´
= 0 if and only if
lim
k0!1
d
³
fk
0
(s) ; fk
0
(t)
´
= 0
which is, by set-inclusion, equivalent to limk!1 d
¡
sk ; tk
¢
= 0.¤
Proof of proposition 5: The individual best response functions of the n-…rm Cournot oligopoly
are given, for all i 2 I , by
fi (s¡i) = max
½
0;
1 ¡ Pj 6=i ¯ ijsj ¡ ci
2
¾
Since the individual best response functions fi are not di¤erentiable everywhere - they have a kink at
strategies s¡i where the interior and the boundary solutions of the utility maximization problem coincide
- the corollary is not immediately applicable to f . Consider therefore the functions hi : Rn¡1 ! R such
that, for all i 2 I ,
hi (s¡i) =
1 ¡ Pj 6=i ¯ ijsj ¡ ci
2
Thus, while the values of fi must not be smaller than zero, hi is not restricted to non-negative values.
Since T-contractivity of the maximizers h = £i2Ihi with domain R entails T-contractivity of the
maximizers f with domain R+, dominance-solvability of G = (Si; Ui)i2I is proved by showing that h
satis…es condition (4) or condition (5) of the corollary. Note that this is, already for T = 1, the case if
condition (6) or condition (7) of proposition 5 are satis…ed.¤
Proof of proposition 6: As individual best response functions obtain, for all i 2 I ,
fi (s¡i) = max
8<
:0;
0
@1 ¡ 1
n
X
j 6=i
sj
1
A ¢ n
2(n ¢ c + 1)
9=
;
Proceeding as in the proof of proposition 4 yields, for all j 6= i,
@hi (s¡i)
@sj
=
¯¯¯
¯ ¡12 (n ¢ c + 1)
¯¯¯
¯
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Thus, condition (4) is satis…ed if ¯¯¯
¯ ¡12 (n ¢ c + 1)
¯¯¯
¯ < 1n
Rearrangement gives the two statements of proposition 6.¤
Proof of proposition 7:
Since the individual best response functions are increasing it su¢ces, by proposition 4, to show
lim
k!1 f
k (0; :::; 0) = lim
k!1f
k (1; :::; 1)
Part A. Pessimistic bidders, i.e., ° > 1
Obviously, f (1; :::; 1) = (1; :::; 1) implying the desired result
lim
k!1 f
k (1; :::; 1) = (1; :::; 1)
Turn to s = (0; :::; 0) and observe that
lim
k!1 °
k ¢ (b; :::; b) = lim
k!1 f
k+1 (0; :::; 0) if lim
k!1°
k ¢ (b; :::; b) · (1; :::; 1)
lim
k!1
fk+1 (0; :::; 0) = (1; :::; 1) else
Since, by assumption, 0 < b and 1 < ° , the desired result obtains:
lim
k!1
fk (0; ::; 0) = (1; :::; 1)
Part B. Optimistic bidders, i.e., ° < 1
First consider s = (0; :::; 0). Then f (0; :::; 0) = (b; :::; b) and f (b; :::; b) = (b; :::;b) imply
lim
k!1
fk (0; :::; 0) = (b; :::; b)
. Turn to s = (1; :::; 1) and observe that, by ° < 1, there exist some …nite number M 2 N such that
fM (1; :::; 1) = °M ¢ (1; :::; 1) < (b; :::; b)
Thus,
fM+1 (1; :::; 1) = (b; :::; b)
implying
lim
k!1
fk (1; :::; 1) = (b; :::; b)
which proves the proposition.¤
Proof of proposition 8:
By equation (11), the best response function with respect to cuto¤-points is given by
fA (sB) =
(1 ¡ ¾B) + r ¢ ¾B
2 ¡ ¾B (19)
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which could have been alternatively obtained from rearranging for the indi¤erent - the cuto¤-point -
type µ¤A :
fA (sB) = µ
¤
A such that
¾B ¢ r + (1 ¡ ¾B) ¢ 1 = ¾B ¢ µ¤A + (1 ¡ ¾B ) ¢ µ¤A ¢ 2
In the light of the corollary, uniqueness of the point-rationalizable strategies is guaranteed if the …rst
order derivative of A’s best response function with respect to B ’s cuto¤-points, i.e.,
dfA
d¾B
(sB) =
2r ¡ 1
(sB ¡ 2)2
is smaller than one. That is, for all ¾B 2 [0; 1],
j2r ¡ 1j < (¾B ¡ 2)2
j2r ¡ 1j < 1 < ¾2B ¡ 4¾B + 4
whereby the second inequality is satis…ed for all r 2 (0; 1). Since the assumptions of proposition 2 are
ful…lled, the unique dominance-solvable strategy is given by the …xed point of (19) in [0; 1].¤
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